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Sumio Hatano 
The conclusion of the German-Sovicl Non-agrression Pact on 22 Au 
£日日t1939 c:aused thc immediatc brcakdown of the on広ul1耳 Japanesc-Gcr-
man negotiations for an alliance directed against the Soviet Union， making 
closer tics with G巴rmanyimposible for the moment. Most of ]apanese poli-
tical and military leaders felt Germany bctrayed thcm by violating the 
spirit of the Anti-Commintern Pact of 19;~6_ 
Soon aftcr thc signinばofNon-ag広rcssionPact. the ]apancse army inト
mαliately carricd out a re-examination of forcign policy. Three policy op-
tions werc debated. Firstly to come to terms with the Soviet Union and 
form a Japancse-Soviet-German alliance; and secondly a conciliately policy 
with Great Britain， the United States and France. The third option was a 
policy of non-intervention in the Europcan war(l) Eventually， ]apanese 
government policy settled on option three that is non-intervention. Thc 
army's stand in the course of the evolution of this policy is onむ ofgreat 
l1tcrest 
Even though the Gerlllan-Soviet Pact had been si宮nedthe Japanesc 
arllly did not believe that Japan and Gerlllany had necessarliy entered into 
an antagonistic relation日hip.There was no alternation in the perception 
that as for thc goal of "defピnseagainst cOlllmunislll" ]apan and Germany 
四*This papt'r is a modified vεrsion of a draft prepared for a Conference on the 
occasion of thc Fiftieth Anivcrsary of the Opening of the Second World War in 
September 1989 organized by the American University of Paris. [ would like to 
六 t山ha山削出加n此1
a c∞O一pr刊es只問e印日此te町r，for he叫Ip〆flω1Icomme口ts0日 my draft. We are p】articularygrateful tω【()the 
]apan Aお問日OClatlO日 of Int校rrnatlOll<悶alRe叶lationsらwilh a f白【nancialsupport for our trip to 
Paris 
were on comrnon ground. Howevcr， the Gerrnan-Soviet rapproachrncnt alSl 
demonstrated a case of the possibility of anti.communist ideology being 
subordinated to“powcr politics" lay in how to use the change in the intcr-
national situation arising from the German-Soviet Pact to settle the China 
war. 
The Japancs巴 armyanticipated that over the Iater half of 1938 
through to the summer of 1939 Anglo・Germanantagonismus would in白
crease and that by arollnd 1942 a刈Vorldwar" break out bctwcen the 
Japan-G巴rmanaIIiance and a Anglo-Soviet aIIiance. In East Asia this 
叫rorldWar" wOllld take the form of a Japanese-Soviet war. Accordingly， 
in order to prepare for this Japanese-Soviet war thcre necded to be an ear-
Iy settement to the China war. and a strengthening of military prepared-
nεss vis-a-vis the Soviet Union_<21 Howevcr， foIIwing the carrying Olt of 
military operations in the China war in the autumlln of 1938 any IlIcan古
of settling thc war aI blt disapeared. The anny emphasized the view that 
th巴Chllngkin記(Chiangkai-shek) government being able to stllbbornly con. 
tinlle resisting was based llpon the diplomatic and military aid provided 
by third nations， in particlllar Great Britain， France and the Soviet Union. 
ln accordance with this line of thinking bringing on end to the British， 
French and Rllssian assistance to Chinese government was社 precondilIoIl
??????
to settling the China war. 
Taking this viewpoint， option one was by for the most desirable. This 
was becallse the army anticipated that option one， that is a Japan-Germ礼n
Soviel alliance， wOllld have the effort of plltting preSSllre on Gr巴atBritain 
and also being an end to the Soviet assistance to Chinese government. In 
particular thぞ middle-rankingofficers within the army supported this poli. 
cy line. This due to their heightened perception that the present ]apan ancl 
Germany's common enemy was Great Britain rather than the Soviet 
UnionY) Throu耳hOlltthe Anglo-]apanese Tokyo Conference on the qlles-
tion of the blockade by the ]apanese arrny of the British concession in 
Tientin (in Jllly 1939)， the army's anti-British sentiments rose and Britain 
was seen as being the nation most responsible for hindering a settlement 
to the China war(4) The army noted Germany st呂rtedin the Spring 19:19 
to make contact with the Soviet Union blt its response to these important 
moves S!OW.(5) One can think of the reason for this as being because the 
army's deepening perception of Britain rather than the Soviet Union as 
being ]apan and Germany's common enemy. Actually， on 22 August it was 
suggested to Ambassador Oshima Hiroshi by State Secretary Ernst von 
Weizsacker that German was in a position to act as an intermediary in im. 
proving ]apanese-Soviet relations and that it was necessary to switch the 
common enemy of ]apan and Germany from the Soviet Union to Great 
Britain.(f) 
EventuaIly， for two reasons option one was not adopted by either the 
army or by the political leaders. Firstly the outcome of the British-Ger-
man war was unclcar and secondly， there was a deepning sense of suspi-
cion toward Germany and that in domestic politics there was a strengthen-
ing trend to bcing pro-Anglo-American elements rather than pro-German 
巴lements.
The Third option， non-intervention policy， meant that ]apan would 
not commit herself to any of the belligerent powers in the European con-
flicts. On the other hand， this option indicated an important policy course 
in regard to co-operating with the Soviet Union and the United States 
which stil un-involved in the European war.(7) Especially， the policy of 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union came to be taken rather seriously 
because of impact of the Nomonhan lncident which turned out to be a total 
defeat of the Kwantung Army at the end of August. However， this is not to 
say that the middle-rank officers relinquished option one. In the early 
Summer of 1940 Germany launched Blitzkrieg on the European front and 
within ]apan the power of the pro-Anglo-American elements weakened， 
once again this first option was proposed by them. 
One objective of this essay is to re-examine the role of the middle-
rank officers within the army and the navy in the policy-making proccess 
of ]apan 's Southward advance from the early summer of 1940 to the sumー
mer of 1941. A Second objective is to gain further insight about the in-
teraction of ]apanese plans to terminate the war in China and the develop-
ment of “Southern advance and Nothern defense" policy. 
??????
1 
The outbreak of the European war in September 1939 forc巴dthe 
western powers with colonial possessions in Southeast Asia to become 
totally preoccupied with Europe. This opened up a magnificient vista for 
]apan ior aggressive expansion into the Southern Area. Suddenly it 
seemed quite within the bounds of posibility to conquer the Dutch East ln-
dies， French lndochina， British Malaya and Singapore. But such a radical 
switch in Japan's national po!icy， could hardy win the support of the more 
cautious naval and army leaders. ln fact， their policy was based on the 
premise that ]apan must not become involved in the European war. ln-
stead， itgave foremost priority to a speedy bailateral settlement of the 
China war， emphasizing to make third parties stop thier assistance to the 
Chungking government through diplomatic and military means. This non-
intervention policy endorsed by the Foreign， Army， and Navy Ministers in 
late December.(8) 
??
?
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ln the early summer of 1940 ]apan's policy of non-intervention in the 
European war and the highest priority given to a bilateral settlement of 
the China war underwent a sudden turnabout. The smashing German suc 
cesses in the West during May-]une had so dazzled ]apanese officials as to 
generate a fever for an 'opportunistic' southern a【lvancethat would take 
advantage of an imminent (so it was believed) German victory. Significant-
ly， the initiative in translating this mood into national policy was taken by 
the middle rank officers within the army. It needs to be emphasized here 
that the army's new southern policy had litle in common with the navy's 
plan; the latter regarded expansion into the Southeast Asia area as quitc 
distinct and separate from the China war. On the other hand， the army 
tended to subsume southeast Asia under the program to construct‘the New 
Ord巴r in East Asia'. The problem thc army faced was how 
terminate the war with China by linking it with a southward advance that， 
in turn， would involve ]apan in the European war. 
Counting on an early German invasion of the British lsles， a handful 
of middle-ranking officers in the army hastily drew up a blueprint for 
forceful southern advance centering on the capture of Britain 's colonial 
to 
possessions in the Far East. The essence of th巴army'sfirst draft of a 
national policy paper (3 July) was that Japan should first conclude the 
China Incident and then strike southward; but it could also be construed 
to imply that， ifpr巴sentedwith a favorable opportunity， Japan might 
attack Britain's Far Eastern possessions. The army planners expected the 
German invasion of Britain to take place in late AuguSt.(9) 
This army draft was referred to the navy on 4 July. The navy， the 
traditional exponent of the strategy of ‘defend the north， advance to the 
south'， accepted the army draft ‘in its general outline'， but pointed out that 
its greatest weakness was that it‘did not consider seriously enough' rela-
tions with the United States. The army took a position that Japan would 
be able to start a war with Britain without provoking American entry; 
thus it stated that military operations would be ‘restricted insofar as 
possible to Britain alone'. But the navy， convinced of the ‘inseparable con日
nections between Britain and the United States'， stressεd that any attack 
on Britain's Far Eastern possessions could lead directly to war with the 
United States. At this point， this was the central difference between the 
army and the navy.(10) 
The army， committed to the China war far more deeply than the navy， 
had been making agonizing efforts in search of an early selltement. By 
early 1940 the army leaders had come round to the conclusion that it 
would be impossible to defeat Chiang Kai-shek Government by military 
means. Did the army abandon the settlement of the China war by the sum 
mer of 1940 and turn instead to a forceful implementation of a southern 
advance? Or were the army planners developing some effective measures 
to terminat巴thewar in China by negotiation and/or force? 
Since the autumn of 1938， th巴army，refraining from large-scale milit-
ary operations， had been focusing its efforts on settlement of the China 
war through political means. This aim was to be attained in two different 
ways; establishment of a puppet regime under pro-Japanese Wang Ching 
wei; and direct negotiations with the Chiang Kai-shek government on 
Chungking. The expectations the army held for collaboration with Wang 
Ching-wei gradually faded as the weakness of his political and economic 
base became increasingly apparent. By late 1939 the ]apanese army came 
?????
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to believe that the only chance for a negotiated settlement was simul-
taneously to deal with the Chiang Kai-shek government 
From May to June in 1940 the negotiations with the representations 
of Chungking dealt with concrete conditions for a cease司fire.The Japanese 
army leaders placed great hopes on the success of negotiations with 
Chungking， although eventually they fel through in October 1940‘The 
significance of these peace maneuvers was that while th巴ylasted they 
gave promise of a cease-fire with China; this expectation， in turn， became 
an important factor which attracted the army planners to the southern 
advance po!icy.(ll) While the peace maneuvers in China set the stage， the 
more important factor that triggered the army's decision for southward 
expansion was the optimistic assumption that Japan would be able to set-
tle the China war by Iinking southward expansion with th巴 anticipated
German conquest of the British Isles.(12) It was against such a background 
that a southward advance policy was decided upon“Essentially it was 
based on‘the army's draft of 3 July 1940. Approved by the top army and 
navy leaderes. this policy was sanctioned on 27 July 1940 by Japanese 
Government.(l:3) m 
??????
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The implementation of the southward advance policy of July 1940 de-
pended to a large extent on improvement of relations with Germany and 
the Soviet Union. As for Germany， Japanese leaderes (especially in the 
army) considered it ess巴ntialto strengthen ties with the Nazis (in the form 
of a military alliance) in order to establish the New Order in East Asia 
and to dominate Southeast Asia. At the same time， however. there was a 
fear among the Japanese that the sweeping German conquest of the Nether-
lands and France might tempt the Germans to extend their control over 
Southeast Asia as well. The central question was the extent to which 
Japan was willing to offer military assistance to the German war efforts 
against Britain. Army and navy staff officers advocated an attack on Sing-
apore. 
Initially conceived as a military alliance directed against Britain， the 
pact with Nazi Germany was transformed into an instrument to deter the 
United States when newly appointed Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke 
revised the draft treaty to include the United States as a target of the 
丘lliance.He argued that Japanese expansion to the south would inevitably 
lead to war with the United Stat日s，and that only by aligning with Ger-
many cOllld Japan stop this perilolls drift. Although Matsuoka repeatedly 
emphasized that a tripartite pact was aimed at preventing a Japanese-
American war by placing Japan in a position of strength， its result was to 
dangerously provoke the United States_(14) It is of interest to noe that the 
army's plan for a tripartite pact (27 July) contained the prototype of 
f，>Tand design to include the Soviet Union into this pact. SlIch a fOllr-power 
pact， the army expectcd would bring strong pressure to bear on the Un-
ited States. On thc other hand， the Japanese Foreign Ministry， d巴eplycon-
cern巴dabout the possibility of aggravating of German-Soviet relations， re-
jected any such fOllr-power plan Olt of hand.(15) However， the idea of a fo 
lIr-power pact was soon taken over by Foreign Minister Matsuoka. New 
Prime Minister Konoe also sided with MatslIoka on this islIe. 
In the negotiation of th巴TripartitePact in Tokyo， Konoe suggested to 
MatslIoka that it wOllld he of no lIse to conclude an alIiance pact with Ger-
l1any and Italy unless the Soviet Union joined it to make it a four炉power
pact.(l G) BlIt， German envoy Heinrich Stahmer pressed Japan for a prompt 
conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. The Japanese Gov巴rnmentfinally l1et 
his requcst when Stahl1er prol1ised that Gerl1any would be an‘honest 
broker' between Japan and the Soviet Union. 
As already mentioned， the Japanese initiative for Tripartite Pact was 
made on the assul1ption that Germany would soon defeat Great Britain. 
But the reslIlt of 'Battle of Britain' proved this aSSlImption to be an ilIu-
sion. This reslllt affected both Berlin and Tokyo. Berlin， which had pre-
viollsly show a cold shoulder to thc earlicr ]apanese proposal for the Pact， 
l1ade a volt-face by sending Ribbentrop's special envoy， Stahmer， to 
Tokyo for a prompt conclusion of the Pact. The motive behind this demar-
che was to involve Japan in the war against Great Britain. More concrete-
Iy， what Hitler had in mind was Japanese attacks on Singapore， Malaya， 
Australia and New Zealand. Therefore Stahmer tried very hard to per-
suade ]apan into automatically participating in the European war.(17) 
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Tokyo， which had hoped to establish a Japancse sphere of influence in 
Southeast Asia after the probable demise of Great Britain， startecl to look 
at the value of the Pact rather differently since mid-Septel1lber upon 
realising that German conqu巴stof Britain was quite unlik日ly(l持)
For Tokyo the Pact would serve to deter the United States from 
blocking the ]apanese southward advance_ Konoe and Matsl10ka began to 
regard the Pact as the only available means to secur巴Japan'sSouthern 
policy and to avoid war with the U nitecl States. ln this connection it is 
worth noting that in the Tokyo negotiations with StahlJl(、r，Matsuoka StlC 
ceeded in retaining the Japanese right to decide when toεnter the war. 
The conclusion of the Paet gave the world the impression of Gerl1lan 
]apanese comracleship in arms， but in fact Japan had no intention of being 
drawn into the war only to help Germany. The日xistenceof th巴Pactitself 
was of paramount il1lportance to Tokyo after Britain's 'finest hour'. And 
Tokyo's strategy could also potentially allow Soviet participation in the 
Pact. FrQm then on Matsuoka's efforts were devotcd to a four-power pact， 
which would l1lore effectively deter the United States from war. Evidence 
shows that Tokyo at that time sincerely believecl in Germany's ability to 
act as an‘honest broker' clespite the fact that Gerl1lan-Soviet relations had 
alreacly deterioratecl considerably since the summer of 1940.(1 ，) 
IV 
Soon after the ]apanese thrust into northern lndochina (on 22 
September 1940) ancl the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact(on 27 Septem-
ber) the peace manel1vers with Chl1nking failed， leaving ]apan with no 
choice bl1t torecognize the Wang Ching-wei regime. This meant that Japan 
had to abandon the idea of a bilateral settlement of the China war; invit-
ably the war became clrawn-out even further. From this time onwarcl， the _ 
army become convinced that the only ‘positive' means left for terminating 
ムー.
the China war was to clepend on a successful armecl Southern aclvance to ハ
obtain the resources.(20) 
The prerequisite for any southward expansion was the removal of the 
threat from the north. The Army General Staff had been pursuing a policy 
四
with the Soviet Unio!l since the settlement oi the 
Nomonhn inciclent唱 itsprimary aim was to put an early encl to the China 
waL For example， the lnteligence Division hacl its eye on shuttin只down
Sovict assistance to the Chungkin認governmcnt(2Ji日!i thrising clamor for 
southern expansion in the SUlllmer of 1940， however哩 theemphasis of 
]apan's policy日witcheclto assuring security in the north to protect thぞ
f1ank ()f her southern aclvance‘The negotiatIons with the Russians that be-
gan in August were aimed at enabling Japan to redeploy her forces in 
Manchllria and North China to Central and SOllthじhina(臼)
TheSE当 cliplomaticefforts， beset with clifficulties from the beginning， 
werc clOOlllCd to failure. The Japanc日e，especially the army， clesired to 
establish closc、relationswith the Sovict Union somewhat comparable to 
the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939， but they could not offer the 
I~ lI日日 ians anytbin日 tan符iblcin return. 九1h<:nJapan proposed a neutrality 
pact in ]uly 1940， th巴 Sovietsclemanded li【Iuiclation of oil ancl coal mining 
rights in northern Sakhalin. The navy in particular oppo日edthe Soviet de 
mand bccause it refusecl to 宮iv(:'up the hi宮h-grad日 oil in northern 
SakhalinCL¥) 
of reconciliation 
In early October the ]apanese Foreign Ministry establishecl a new 
policy toward Mosow based upon Matsuoka's iclea. The upshot of this 
policy was to conclude a ]apanese-Sovict non-ag日ressionpact i nsteacl of a 
neutrality pact. Matsuoka further aimed at combinin耳 thctripartitc Pact 
witb tbis non-aggression pact in a form of a four-powcr Pact. Such a Pact予
in Tokyo's opinion， was to be based upon r巴cognitionby Berlin and Tokyo 
of Soviet exclu日iveinterests in OuterョMongolia，Afghanistan and Iran(2'!) 
Towards the日nclof October， Moscow was informecl of the ]apanese prop 
O日aIfor a nOIl-ag只resionPact through the Japanese Ambassador in Mos 
cow. A lllonth later the Soviet government responclecl to Tokyo with a 
counter proposal of a neutrality Pact， to which Moscow even attachecl the 
condition that ]apan should abanclon her inter巴stsin Northern Sakhalin. 
During the Molotov-Ribbentrop negotiations in Berlin in lllid-Nov巴m
ber the latter proposed a fOllr-power Pact司 butthe Soviets・reactionwas 
very ne耳ative.After Molotov's visit to Berlin， Hitler discarclecl the plan of 
four-power Pact ancl orderecl preparation for “Barbarossa". But， Mat~ヨ lloka ，
??????
d巴eplyench anted by the iclea of the four叩powerPact， stil desir巴【Ito make 
such a pact by reality persuading Hitler and Stalin during his visit to Ber-
lin and Moscow. 
To his chagrin Matsuoka realized in his Berlin negotiations (27.29 
March 1941) that Hitler had no interest at al in Matsuoka's grand design 
of a four.power pact. Also， Matsuoka was informed that Berlin would not 
act as an‘hone日tbroker・betweenTokyo and Moscow. That meant Mat-
suoka had no other option but to conclude a Japanese-Soviet pact without 
German's good offices. There is no denying that Matsuoka must have been 
very disappointed at the bleak prospect for attaining his rnain goal， name. 
ly a four.power pact. However、asfar as the possibility of conclucling an 
acconl with Moscow was concerned， Matsuoka was encouraged in his con. 
versation日withRibbt'lltrop. T郎、 GermanFor巴ignMinistcr offered him two 
promises. Firstly， a Gcrmany war with the Soviet Unioll wOllld not re. 
q臼ireTokyo's cleclaration of war on Moscow. Seconclly， shoulcl Japan be at 
war with the Sovid Ullion， Berlin woulcl automaticaly declare war on 
MOSCOW.(~5) 
??????
Th日reis one more thing to bc Ilcntionecl regard to th.is. Soon after his 
arrival in Berlin， an anti-Gcrman coup.cl' ctat occurred in Yugoslavia (Be-
lograde). Surprisingly， Moscow showed its solidarity with the new YlI耳03.
lav Government by prornptly concluding a Pact of Friendship and Non 
Aggr巴ssionwith it. Germany began invacling Yu宮oslaviawhen Matsuoka 
was heading f()r Moscow. Altho日記hMatsuoka witnessed the rapid cle. 
terioration of G巴rman-Sovietrelations， itin turn offered him an opportun. 
ity for his succ巴ssfulnegotiations in Moscow. ln fact when he arrived in 
Moscow， the German army had already crushed the new Yu誌のslavregime 
Matsuoka thought that Moscow， now facing an ever growing threat from 
Germany， would be receptive to his proposal for a pac(.(26) Such a pact 
would enable Moscow to concentrate its military defense against Germany 
and would possibly enable ]apan to move southward. After some futile 
negotiations with Molotov， a breakthrough took place when MatslIoka met 
with Stalin Ol April 12‘J 941. Stalin proposed a Treaty of Ncutrality， 
leaving asicle the sticky problcm of Northern Sakhalin. On the following 
day the Treaty was日igncd.
Japanc日('officials sccm to have con日icleredthat thcrc was a rcason for 
Stalin's decision to conclude a Neutrality Pact with Japan: through thc 
Nculrality Pacl Stalin could prevcnl ]apan、Il1V在日iOI1of thc Soviet Union， 
yct hc could also hclp thc Chlln立kin日立overnment.lf hc had conclllded a 
Non，aggres日ionPact， hc cOllld not have continlled military as日lstanceto 
Chian日 Kai，shek;the conclusion of Japanese，Sovict Non，aggrcssion Pact 
would 10符icallyh昌vemeant thc termination of the Soviet，Chinese Non， 
aggrcsちionPact of 19:37.(27) ln fact， Moscow continued its military assist 
日nccto China， which macle it even more c!ifficult for Japan (0 militarily re， 
solvc thc China war. Thc Japanc日む armywas dissatisficd with the conclll 
sion of a Neutrality Pact， rather than a Non'a日gres当ionPact in re耳arcllo 
the following two points. Fir日tly，thc p礼ctwOl.ld havc a negativc psysholo 
gical impact llpOll thc Chllngking government. Scconclly， thc Pact woulcl 
not sccure Japan'日 arrnecl日outhwardcxpan日io口町 [n fact， the army clid not 
change its military posture vis，a，vis the Soviet Unio日12K)Nor clid the 
arrny activatc its southcrn policy after the conclusion of thc Ncutrality 
Pact 
V 
On 5 Junc 1941 Tokyo receivcd information from Ambassador Oshi 
ma Hiroshi in Bcrlin to the effect that a Gerrnan，Soviet war was imminent. 
Since April thc rumors of Gcrman，Sovict hostilities had bcen convcycd by 
Japancse attachcs in European capitals， but they could not be sllbst昌ntl'
atecL On :iJune Ambassador Oshima was told abollt Operation Barbarossa 
directly by Hitlcr ancl Ribbentrop(29) The navy demandecl 'a policy of non 
intervention in the ev巴ntof Gc、rman，Soviet hostilities. I!owever， in regard 
to Southern expan日ion，it immediately accclerated its dcmands for the con 
_ struction of military bases ancl thc stationing of troops in SOllt日rn1ndochi， 
三 na ancl Thailand(:lIl) 1n the Army噌 aswell， the news of the 則的rcakof the 
German，Sovict war fllrther accelerated this move(:ll) On 10 July the Joint 
型 削 l凶i公εm附n代川e
ノ、
that the stationing of troops and the construction of air bases in southern 
lndochina bc carried out as日oonas possiblc(2) 
The Gennan aUack on the Soviet Union of 22 ]llne J10t only shattcred 
Matslloka's grand design of a four power pact but also tipped the balance 
()f powers against the Axis powers by driving the Soviet Union into the 
arms of Britain ancl thc Unit日dStates. However， this development dicl not 
tゼmptthe ]apanese 1足立H]ersto demancl abrogation of the Tripartite P乱ct:on 
the contrary， thcy chosじ tocont.inue supporting the Pact白 Thcypredieted 
that th巴 Soviet-Germanwar wOllld encl in a qllick ancl overwhelming Ger-
man victory and believecl that this war woulcl provide a chance to remove 
the traditional threat from the north， not to mention an opportunity to 
strike sOllth. Since the Japanesc army receivecl Ambassador ()shillla's clis-
patch of ;= ] llne， thc社rmyhad bccn formulating a new nation乱1policy: its 
conclusion was that ]apan ShOllld expcdite stationing her troops in日ollth
ern lnclochina， while prcparing resort to arms 昌吉aInstthと north (the Far 
Ea日tcrnterritory of the Soviet Union(l'l) in case thc war situation ShOlllcl 
turn Olt to b巴'cxtremelyadvantageolls' for 1apan. On thc other hancl， the 
navy was opposed to a war aιainst th巴 SovictUnion， bu川l此t1川nthe encl it aぽ仁←
qli必esceclto th恥(ε、armyγ'spolicy 0口 concli此tiωonthat 'pr巴paratlOnaga創II日tthe 
t戸Jr 
wa日 reconf打irm白(巴当dand s汁al1ct冗Jωone【dat the lmperial Conference of 2 Jllly 
194i 
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On thεfollowing day， orders were iSSllCd to prepare ior sOllth. Thc 
army ancl th巳 navyproceecled to prcpare for both peac巴flland armed aclv-
ances， and 01 28 July Japanesc troops commcncecl to marchιpeacef日ly'
into the southcrn Indochina. ()n ;) August， Immecliately after a total oil 
embargo went into effect. the navy's First Committee (that was composecl 
of micldle-rank officers) draftecl a paper stating that diplo111atic negotia-
tions and war preparations ShOlllcl be purslIecl in parallel until late 
OctoberCH) Ifa compromise with the United States shollld fail then， ]apan 
mllst open hostiliti巴S.A hanclful of the First Committee took initiativc in 
policy making within the navy and cven preemptecl the arllly in forcing 
the decision for war with the Unitecl States. The Illlpcrial Conference of 6 
September acloptccl a new national policy basecl on the demancls of the 
First Committec s巴tout 01 ;) AUgllst(lG) 
。fficers of each policy the military within sectlOn Midcllc-rank 
machinery were proccupied with their immediate and parochial bureaucra苧
tic interests， and were often guided by narrowly strategic views in making 
a chain of fateful decisions leading to war with the United States. 
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